Posted by
Jacek_Popiel on Thursday, October 21, 2010 9:11:05 PM
There is no question that, barring a major unforeseen event, the state of the economy will be the main determinant in the November election.
The official line is that despite issues with employment, mortgages and credit the overall picture is improving. Should this be so, the political map is not likely to be drastically altered in the fall. The Democrats will lose some seats in both houses of Congress, but with a stronger economy they will make up for it in 2012.
If such improvement, on the contrary, does not materialize, all bets are off.
This then leads to two questions: first, is the current recovery for real; second, if it is not, why? If the current recovery falters, whoever has the answer to the second question might emerge from the election a winner, possibly for the long term.
First then comes the analysis of the “recovery”, and that raises an important caveat: that whatever improvement there might be in economic conditions is not the result of “normal” economic forces.
In the past it has been assumed that the economic cycle had a “natural” life of its own, fed by investor and consumer psychology, supply and demand, speculative excesses and panics, and so on. Governments could influence this process to a degree, but not abolish or replace it.
The current “recovery” on the other hand is unique, due to a massive and coordinated intervention by governments across the globe. Left to themselves the markets, the current theory goes, would have crashed into a “second Great Depression”. To avoid such an outcome a massive bail-out of the financial system was needed, following which restored credit availability and consumption would lead to an economic revival.
In other words, the current economic cycle is a manufactured artifact. As this has never been attempted on such a scale, we have no past experience to tell whether it will succeed or not.
At the present time, that question is still unanswered. The financial bailout and unprecedented government spending have for the time being arrested the downward slide and in places brought some improvement. At the same time warning signs of further trouble abound: still rising mortgage delinquencies, state deficits and unemployment in the U.S.; real estate inflation and excessive credit expansion in China; sovereign default risk in Europe, and so on. Underlying it all is the often expressed warning that the “recovery” could collapse if government support is withdrawn at any time in the foreseeable future.
Also troubling is the fact that the financial sector, the practices of which have precipitated the crisis, has gone back with a vengeance to these very same activities. This is particularly true of the stock markets, the rise of which is out of all proportion to the improvement in the underlying economic data. A market panic, even a limited one, would bury whatever “recovery” there might be. What if one took place this month or next?
This leads to the second question asked above: why would the remedies currently employed not work?
The question itself generates another query: What was the focus of the measures put in place to fight the crisis? The crash originated within the financial sector, which had undergone extraordinary development over the last two decades. The remedial measures taken were, for the most part if not exclusively, aimed at rescuing the financial system from its own misdeeds, at very high cost to governments and, ultimately, taxpayers.
The key justification for this effort and expense was the assumption that the financial system in its current state was essential to the economy and therefore had to be rescued. This applied particularly to the largest financial institutions, which were the main recipients of governmental largesse, and were, unlike a number of smaller banks, duly bailed out by the state.
These large institutions were the primary culprits regarding the risky financial practices which caused the crash. These activities were, as mentioned by Lord Turner, head of the British Financial Services Authority, of questionable, if any, social value. That is, they contributed little or nothing to the overall economy.
To put it plainly, was the rescue aimed primarily at the financial system and its large banks? Was the fate of the overall economy only a secondary consideration, as well as a convenient cover for spending public money on institutions that in actuality deserved to fail?
The question is important because if the economy was secondary in the scheme, then its recovery is far less likely than if it had been the primary target, particularly with a financial system still dysfunctional and at the same time still hogging the attention and resources of government authorities.
And if that is indeed the case, we are in for a long, hot summer, and a messy, unpredictable election.